Disseminar
A: Perhaps the first thing that should be said about the work in question is that it displays its own existence as content, and only exists through this content. It questions itself, asking even how it can ask such a question, and, in turn, uses this enquiry as the base material of the work. Without the one, there’s no other, nothing to ask, nothing to ask about. The piece is thus hermetically sealed, engaged in a conversation that is reciprocal and irresoluble, spoken in its own private tongue. And closed off to external critique.
C: What are we doing talking about it then?
B: It’s comparable to a non-representational painting, which represents itself only as a painting, visibly demonstrating the transparency of the medium. Such a work is ‘about’ the purification of the object, the subtraction of extraneous noise and information, painting boiled down to its essence. And yet, this process, which in modern art history is seen as a trajectory towards complete abstraction, is ultimately a surrender to the phenomenal, a confession that there is only a painted canvas. The question becomes then; what can be said about the incommunicable? As it turns out, plenty. The reduction of painting to its purest form, either as a shape within the picture or as the picture itself, is a statement against the image, a position informed by Platonic idealism, Kant, Greenberg, Van Doesburg, Albers. This is the inherent contradiction of the ‘pure’ work; that it is dependent on context and language. This kind of thing-in-itself seeks to exist in a vacuum, as an eternal, untouchable end and ideal of painting. However, from this moment, our contemporary vantage point, it is possible to look back at the high end of modernity, and see instead the earliest signs of the next stage, where the artwork acts as both the culmination of modern abstraction and as a precursor to post-modernity’s fascination with surface. It is a shift from the impenetrability of the concrete object to the shallowness of the open work. At the same time, this formal shift is accompanied by a conceptual one. There is, on the one hand, the absolute yet indecipherable truth of the former, the noumenon, in Kantian terminology, which transcends thought and experience, and on the other, a fragmentary and incoherent constellation of discursive sites, possibilities and hypotheses, unable to establish a dominant position.
C: Of course, this isn’t a painting. But you’ve opened up the idea of concreteness as a key quality of the work, so we can start from there. It’s probably also a good idea to recognise that there is a distinction between this quality as a defining characteristic of high modernism, and self-referential work that is more dialectical, able to accommodate other voices even as the piece continues to talk about itself. It’s the difference between showing and telling. To go back to the example of painting, Rene Magritte’s image of an image of a pipe comments upon its own status as representation without resorting to pure abstraction and deliberate obfuscation. The same with Mark Tansey’s works. But we’re not engaged in painting at this moment, but rather looking at the conditions of our own dialogue, a dialogue that is in a common language, that interrogates itself with clarity.
A: Except that it doesn’t. The interpretation of language is dependent on language, it cannot go outside the text, as Derrida would have it. It might be possible to come up with any number of interpretations of Magritte’s or Tansey’s paintings, but these readings will still adhere to the conditions of theory. They are necessarily subjective and incomplete. To speak authoritatively is to speak objectively or from outside the subject of enquiry, both of which are impossible propositions, even for the artist. So really we haven’t moved from one stage to another at all. The contemplation of the absolute, concrete piece of work requires a certain amount of faith, a belief that the inexpressible ideal is present yet unutterable. The monochrome, the lump of raw clay, the photograph of the photograph; these objects are airtight, self-sufficient, and impervious to criticism. The viewer looks at something that is meant only to be looked at, that is only the medium itself, and that is essentially anti-illusionary. What you see is what you see, in other words. However, the dialectical, self-referential work, which allows for commentary and critique, is still dictated by its medium, in this case, language. This metaphysical impasse ensures that our critique can only ever be subjective, a relative position, and that any conclusion we might come to is necessarily hypothetical. It remains in a state of ‘textual play’, an aesthetic of suggestions and proposals, ideas and plans. Such a work is neither true nor false; this division no longer exists.
C: Doesn’t that also apply to your own explanation?
A: Of course. Again, we depend on faith in a system which doesn’t listen to its own advice. If there is such a thing as objectivity, it can mean only the system of relativism itself, which absorbs subversive texts as evidence of pluralism, without letting such arguments alter its fundamental structure. In this way, it undermines critique through inclusion, assimilating it as the base of a disparate, porous and aesthetic system. The relationship of the subjective argument to the overall organization of these arguments resembles that of signified to signifier, although I prefer Fredric Jameson’s analogy of the sound of the dog’s bark to the dog- the dog isn’t named after the bark. The system and its theoretical production are not subject to the same laws.
C: So the system, like you in this discussion, has covered itself. We can go on talking, but only to hear the sound of our own voices. There is no possibility of disproving your statement, because the medium of discourse is already compromised. It’s like an inversion of that familiar argument of the gallery non-visitor: “I don’t know what I like, but I know about art.” The viewer is able to comment upon the work, interpret it, yet any value judgement he makes is offset by the existence of any number of other, equally relevant, subjective opinions.
B: Also, the system evolves. It isn’t static but something that is affected and determined by its production. There’s a tendency to treat this quite heavily reified dialectical system as if it were independent of the information and content which wrote and shaped it, and which continues to shape it. Really, all we have here is an accumulation of text, complementing and/or contradicting each other, without establishing any of the old dominant hierarchies. Or at least that’s the idea. But again, in some sort of hangover of modernism, we believe that this is structured and stabilised, maintained in an invisible, unknowable arrangement that we can only define negatively. So, apparently it exists, but cannot be proved, cannot be taken apart. Or maybe it doesn’t exist, but is merely the ‘theoretical production’ of some of the loudest participants. We’re led to believe that the system is inclusive and is therefore able to integrate subversion as part of its egalitarian nature, and, in the same breath, that the theory that constitutes and reinforces this chimera is beyond reproach. Thus, it is the absolute truth that everything that makes up its composition is untrue, because the component parts are subjective, and therefore, only partially true. It contradicts itself.
C: It’s impossible to delineate an infinite range of viewpoints, without favouring one or another. And that takes me back to my previous point, that the discourse is compromised by a levelling of value in order to sustain an artificial and unnatural equilibrium. We end up with a kind of pure relativism, which I don’t think was the original intention. It’s a constant unsettling of the foundations, as if truth itself was the enemy, instead of a series of ideologies which didn’t quite work out. Yet in spite of this supposed break from modernism, the whole enterprise has this post-Marxist tinge, with its continual revolutions, dismantled hierarchies, and supposed equality of viewpoints, all firmly located in theory, without the repercussions of enforcing it in practice. It’s like a fantasy version of how things could have been, and a tacit admission that the dream is over. But this isn’t the point. Rather, like their failed utopian vision of society, this virtual, theoretical system cannot resist human nature. There will always be a relentless need for one stance to dominate others, to exercise its ‘will to power’, so to speak. And despite its pluralist structure, or anti-structure if that’s how we’re supposed to think of it, some voices are spoken over and drowned out in the cacophony, while others are heard clearly. This premise of Jameson’s, with his differentiation between the system and the product, the dog and the bark, can easily be seen as just one of those audible, insistent arguments, shouting loudly that ‘all opinions are equal’. It’s an idea which is good in theory, only as long as it stays in theory. And this is the system itself; a controlled environment, a play-room. That might not be a bad thing. It can encourage new ideas and opinions, areas of difference which were previously overlooked or disregarded. Also, we might have been less hasty in embracing the grand, and largely deeply flawed, ideologies of modernism if these ideas had received a period of critical examination. But, ultimately, when are we able to apply these new developments, if they are to be merely subjective, speculative theories?
B: Maybe we’re looking at it the wrong way, as either/or. Isn’t it possible to apply an idea critically, without subscribing to it wholeheartedly? Perhaps this ‘post-Marxist’ tinge is merely an acknowledgement of past mistakes, an attempt to implement the things that worked and dispose of those that didn’t. It seems that, after modernism, we feel we must necessarily go to extremes and endings, even to ‘pure’ relativism, when relativism itself depends on context and conditions, on the very impurities of theory. I wonder if, on some level, we want to look for narratives, universals and conspiracies, as a way of objectifying the disparate and the subjective. This is the will to power as much as the critic who writes the system. The critique of the pluralist system suggests a distrust of the uncertain, and a fear of aporia, the point of indecision where evidence both proves and disproves truth. It jars with the image of oneself as unified, as a consistent identity.
A: So we’ve reached another aspect of the piece in question; that of schizophrenia, and the subject as a variety of perspectives. Consequently, my reading of a work does not remain static but is affected by the subtle changes and modifications of this image of my self. Am I able to hold two opposing viewpoints at the same time? Perhaps, but only with the recognition that neither of these attains the conditions of truth, and that they are not held with any assurance but may still be tentative steps towards a considered, synthesised decision.
B: There’s a connection with the loss of the artist’s authorial pre-eminence here too. It’s as if the subject, in being granted the decision to dictate what is and isn’t art, has usurped the role of the artist. They can play with the work, change their minds, adapt and customize its meaning. Every aspect of society is now open to interpretation, as an anthropological sign or a type of readymade, without actually ‘making’ the work. The old dichotomies of artist and viewer, activity and passivity, and even art and interpretation seem to have dissolved into a haze. This puts the artist, understood in the conventional sense as a painter or writer, in the position of the viewer or reader, interpreting their own work. The image or text is merely a cipher for meaning, and their own interpretation no longer enjoys the privilege of artistic intention or authenticity. Instead of consolidating the author in an act of pure expression of the ‘self’ or the ‘soul’ or some other vague and untenable concept of identity, the text destabilises the unity of the maker. He is no longer able to recognize himself in his characters, or the generic codes and tropes of his work, which, after all, may represent some unknown reader far better than they portray their writer. This is what it means to break down objectivity – the alienation of the artist from his own production.
C: Are you serious? Hasn’t this idea of the ‘death of the author’ died out itself yet? I’d say that it’s petrified into the opposite of what it put forth, and turned into a doctrine based around Roland Barthes himself, even if he refuses to call himself an author.
B: And I’d take the other view, that it’s more relevant than ever. Certainly, with the barrage of image and information-based media through the expansion of television and the internet, it seems like there is less time to verify and identify fact from fiction. As such, everything is tainted with the suspicion of partiality. In addition, ideas are freely stolen and regurgitated, texts plagiarized, references unacknowledged, concepts distorted, and all usually without any consequence. Who can trace a thought back to its absolute origin? It’s like that saying about the history of philosophy being a series of footnotes to Plato, or something to that effect, and I suppose in this context it doesn’t matter what the exact quote or who the author is. Ultimately, we cannot place ideas or works; they are anonymous and adaptable, pieced together from fragments and in constant flux. They are disseminated in an instant, and usually anonymously, whether that’s from a domain name in the middle of nowhere or as a second-hand opinion in an argument. And, staying with this concept of the internet as a technological model of language and communication itself, the individual site is not a closed, concrete statement, but is linked to other pages, other spaces.
C: What you’re really talking about here is a variation on the autonomous author, an idea which probably never existed in the first place. Nevertheless, the art-object is still representative of its maker, even if the artist no longer conceives of himself as the absolute point of creation, a notion which died out with action painting and automatic writing and now seems like a momentary historical trend. As it is, the work is made up of various strands of influence, images cut out of mass-media and art history, lines of text which have solidified into cliché and pastiche. But I don’t think this implies cynicism or ironic detachment on the part of the author, even if there is an awareness, and wariness, about modernism’s cult of the individual genius. The return to past movements, and the picking up of old techniques and strategies by contemporary artists, is just as likely to represent their disdain for the avant-garde trajectory, which left behind a number of unfinished projects in the rush towards purification. That straight line, marked out retrospectively by Clement Greenberg, treats art as if it was science, as a teleological advance in incremental stages.
A: Or it’s set out from the other end of modernism, just as Marinetti and the futurists expected. But that’s not the point. The very act of returning and re-contextualising these elements is itself a gesture dredged up from the historical moment of the situationists, who détourned images from popular culture, comic books, cinema and visual art and juxtaposed them with their own slogans and manifestoes. So there is something of an infinite loop, a conundrum of reference and influence, where the contemporary artist who plunders the detritus and remains of history is, perhaps unknowingly, re-working the techniques of others who had previously done the same. Even the rejection of novelty has been tried before, and because of this, there is some sincerity about the appropriation of extant materials. It isn’t original, or progressive, and definitely not revolutionary. It is the authentic expression of an existence defined by the consumption of information, digested and shat out as ‘new’ product. The innate character, the essence, of the individual is revealed as a series of quotations and preferences, a temporary collection of sources, sound-bites, rumours, opinions. Yet instead of accumulating into a suitably complex and sophisticated knowledge, these fleeting impressions dissipate and give way to others, without ever adding to the experience of the recipient. They are, in accordance with the schizophrenic aspect of the work, like voices in the head, or the series of personas which exist at the same time without being aware of one another.
B: Well, maybe dimly aware…
A: The text or image that is created by this subject is therefore the reconstitution of these impulses and a representation of the self only insofar as it collates a variety of transient passages into a loose affiliation, a sudden cohesion and, all too quickly, a collapse and re-alignment. That brief flicker of stability is too fragile to be preserved in paint or script; it has already changed and taken on fresh, alternate meanings, from inception to actualisation and eventual distribution. An artist who sees his work as an automatic gesture, a slash of paint across the tabula rasa of the bare canvas, doesn’t realize that that instant was preconceived, built up out of history and knowledge, continuing on after the paint has dried.
C: What are we talking about here? We seem to be slipping back and forth between the visual artwork and the text, the static and the temporal.
A: That’s what the piece is, though. A meaning is written for an image, and revised over time. The viewer fixes his understanding of the work, delves into it more thoroughly after the initial impression recedes, and erases that first reading even as he develops it.
C: That’s not what I mean. You’re approaching everything from the position of the spectator, as if the book and the image are the same, and are understood the same. But what is this? Lecture, performance, conceptual artwork, debate; this has nothing to do with the painted canvas, or systems of communication. This discussion is not an analogy for a larger discursive environment. It has limitations in its topic and number of participants, a set path to follow, although one that is being stretched with every digression. Nevertheless, it sticks to theory, and a fairly orthodox one at that. So this conversation is mapped out already, but ultimately goes nowhere, as was established in the opening sentences. It’s not enough to say that it’s down to the viewer to tell us what he thinks is going on. Your artist is the same as your viewer, right? So you tell me what this work means.
B: I think there’s a point there. Aren’t we supposed to be determining the basic constituents of this piece, not language or art in general? After all, this conversation can be placed in a historical context which includes the performative art of James Lee Byars or Tino Sehgal, Brechtian theatre, concrete poetry, Robert Morris’s ‘Box with the Sound of it’s own Making’, structural filmmaking, the vortograph and the rayograph, ‘Tristram Shandy’; an entire history built around the investigation of the work through the work itself. And this version of events necessarily overlaps with another history, another series of works, which concern themselves with the position of the artist, objectivity, authenticity, and the lack or loss of these qualities. Or another sequence, of various works which interpret history, or which exist only momentarily, or are visibly and intentionally artificial. A piece can be dissected through its similarity to others, even if some of these related works might seem at odds with each other. It doesn’t have to all neatly fit together, to form a seamless, perfect argument. These discrepancies between artistic or theoretical positions offer a place to contribute and develop the more established, albeit incomplete, discourses. Things need to stay open-ended. I’m thinking, for example, of Theodor Adorno’s ‘Minima Moralia’, where the text is broken into sections or topics which do not necessarily build towards a finished argument, but veer off in tangents and departures. The author makes a point of acknowledging this, that it isn’t meant to be read as a complete, unified work, but as a series of reflections or even as attacks from different directions. For Adorno, what he calls the “disconnected and non-binding character of the form, the renunciation of explicit theoretical cohesion” is an expression of both subjective experience and the inevitable failure of subjectivity as a system. There is a quote from him later in the same book; “the denial of objective truth by recourse to the subject implies the negation of the latter: no measure remains for the measure of all things.” And, of course, Adorno, having already recognised in the logic of the Enlightenment the eventuality of fascism and genocide, would’ve been aware just how far a philosophical totality can translate into actual totalitarianism. So there is a real, political basis behind this fragmentation that insists on instability, yet is nevertheless weakened as a system by this insistence. The only alternative to a series of alternatives would be the definitive, singular history, driven by progress towards the eradication of difference, in thought and reality.
C: Except that this, this seminar doesn’t represent difference in any way. It’s merely a trick of ventriloquism, or do you usually carry prepared notes on Adorno? Our discussion has only the appearance of spontaneity and free thought, but really this has all been written out, even this interruption.
B: Original, spontaneous thought is exactly what we’re against here. The idea that because an argument is presented through dialogue or casual conversation it is somehow truer than the premeditated, scripted monologue is questionable. It’s like saying that the straight talking of the down-to-earth politician or the reportage of the journalist is more authentic, more honest, because it is couched in a particular style. As if these manners of speech cannot be simply picked up and tried on to suit the task at hand, and discarded just like any other disguise. I don’t think this seminar is any guiltier than any other lecture or essay. It does follow a certain, artificial format, but at the very least acknowledges its faults by incorporating disagreement into its structure. Better these imperfections than to feign infallibility, hiding behind a one-way argument which isn’t able to admit its own shortcomings or allow any external dissent.
C: It’s a get-out clause, though, isn’t it? Like Adorno, defiantly rejecting cohesion and objectivity, and distrusting subjectivity. It’s like he’s found the one theoretical perspective which cannot be disproved, and only because he’s already gotten there first. And that’s this talk, too. It’s the simulation of open debate, a forum which allows for intrusions and segues, but which is controlled irregardless.A: If it is controlled, it’s only because there’s still confusion over what a theory of aesthetics is meant to achieve. Is it anything other than a bourgeois preoccupation, an entrancement with the flickering shadows of an absent reality? We are only arguing over speculation and representation, or, at least, we might be arguing, we appear to be arguing. This is our current position; unable to make our minds up between the instability of simultaneous, subjective locations and the simplicity of the objective grand narrative, everything becomes tainted with doubt. So the work attempts to figure itself out, through the tactic of delegating its various lines of thought to three characters, three mouthpieces. It’s a device, like the unreliable narrator, or the repetition of events which approach the same subject from different angles.
C: So if this is actually meant to be some kind of artwork or performance, then why is it necessary for it to relentlessly question itself? Isn’t it generally better for a work to retain some ambiguity, to pose questions rather than attempt to answer them? We dismiss modernity as a misjudgement, a forced effort to narrow down difference into a singular objectivity, in politics and art, yet all we are left with is the replication of its literary and formalist tricks, and a resigned fascination with an image, having already given up on finding any significance. It’s nothing more than a series of experiments where we already know the answer. This work tries to justify its own existence through rigorous self-examination, but, take away that perpetual search for an underlying motive, and the whole thing crumbles into nothingness. There is nothing to be found in this conversation other than our reason for having it. Besides that, we’re just filling time.
B: A purely formal art, without the promise of transcendence or the discovery of truth, will always be just that. This dialogue fulfils those conditions of a non-progressive, anti-hierarchical artwork, in that it doesn’t seek to attain completion. It might come to an arbitrary stop, abandoned in mid-stream, but can always be picked up again with a new set of characters and new directions. I don’t even know if it would be possible to return to the notion of an ideal truth, certainly not with a clear conscience. Even if, and this is already happening, there is an attempt to reduce pluralism into a simplistic Manichaean worldview, like a throwback to the good old days of capitalism versus communism, it’s impossible to erase difference. The lines of communication have changed, been rewired, both conceptually and technologically, so that a dissident point of view is able to occupy a space outside of the mainstream. In fact, the mainstream itself has become so decentralised that even the prevailing, dominant perspective is easily seen to be subjective at heart, manipulated for the sake of its proponents. So there is a certain sophistication which has come with the expansion of the discursive field, where previously marginalised positions have gained a new visibility and are able to engage with and participate in the system. What they can accomplish by this remains to be seen.
A: Nothing, because they’ve already spread themselves too thin. Awareness of power doesn’t necessarily equip the subject with the means to challenge it. Even in our vaunted system of open communication and debate, there is a tendency to regard antagonistic viewpoints as mere conspiracy theories. The only solution seems to be a complete withdrawal from the argument.
C: And yet you keep talking.
A: I’m just suggesting it as an idea. I don’t have to believe in any of this. We’re engaged in a round of speculation, without any real, concrete ramifications, or any of this supposed connection to the system of discourse. We are the product, remember? That’s why this discussion, in all its transparent artifice, is an accurate portrayal of contemporary art discourse. The dispersal of objective truth into subjective components negates any form of general compromise. At best, we see small, isolated groups of critics agreeing a temporary cease-fire in their interpretations, before disturbing this peace with a new development or angle. The system is maintained through the separation and specialization of these unstable critical positions, who’ve accepted impotence and inaction over obliteration. Either live peacefully within the system or be destroyed by the system. That’s not to say that this decision has been forced upon them, on us, I should say, but rather that it’s been willingly agreed to and encouraged. We’re the ‘young conservatives’, as Habermas has it, consciously relegating culture to its own niche, segregated from society and economy except so far as the system permits. The artist is allowed his little gesture, his micro-utopian interventions, but always within the context of relativism, where such events are normalized and made harmless.
B: Clearly, this conversation doesn’t fall in with that kind of work - we’re closer to a kind of theatrical performance here - but that attitude of dragging everything else down brings me back to Adorno and his view that the philosopher’s role isn’t to win the argument but to lose in such a way that his adversary discredits his own thesis. I realize that your position is one of post-modernity having sublimated the most dangerous instincts of the avant-garde, but this was an end that was present in the beginnings of modernism, in the futurist credo that they too would be forgotten and replaced, supplanted by other movements. The modern urge to resist stabilization, to push history forward, has paradoxically ended up on the side of tradition, looking backward from the contemporary moment. It’s been absorbed into the present, so that this past is always a re-contextualised version of the actual period, more of a given vision of the pre-post-modern. Is this anything other than an idealized past where the future could still innocently be looked forward to, a perpetual continuum of progression without an end in sight?
C: Isn’t this seminar just an exercise in denial, then? Isn’t that why it’s “closed off to external critique”, as was stated at the outset, and why our arguments are no more than a formal device and an illusion of free discourse? This work, this concrete discussion, isn’t a display of plurality, but a reproduction of it, a singular, sterile image of a conversation. And that includes this apparent deviation from the script, which only looks like an attempt to inject some unpredictability into the debate. Even that’s just a pose. Rather than allowing the space for irregularity and actual subjective interjection, this aesthetic object approximates these properties within itself, within the complete, predetermined nature of the modern work.
A: As you point out, I made this all clear from the beginning. Just because you’ve taken the long way around to come back to this point, it doesn’t mean that this discussion hasn’t been honest in its intentions. Even though the system of relativism claims to have moved on from modernity and its attendant notions of objective truth and innate aesthetic value, in reality there is only the dispersal of that truth. The whole has extended its reach to incorporate any trace of difference. It has made theory into aesthetics, a subjective opinion amongst a theoretically infinite number of contrary and complementary, yet always equivalent, opinions. Where’s the proof either for or against the system? It’s already part of it as a component of the very structure it seeks to analyse, and which, because of its subjectivity, it cannot grasp. The criticism of the object is what constitutes the form of the object. And, as such, the notion of the concrete, the self-enclosed, and the autonomous work permeates the post-modern condition, which is essentially just a development of the modern. In the same way that the anomalies of the avant-garde were edited and re-contextualised to fit the narrow constraints of Greenberg’s definition of modernism, the contemporary system takes in and ‘post-modernizes’ everything which might remain outside of its structure, irrespective of chronology or intent. It has expanded its capacity, no longer discarding that which doesn’t fit, but adjusting its own parameters to include the incongruous, the hostile and the negative.
C: So I guess there’s no point in taking any questions, then.
B: No. No questions.
